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Abstract. Security and reliability issues in distributed systems have been
investigated for several years at LAAS using a technique called
Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering (FRS). The aim of FRS is to tolerate
both accidental and intentional faults: the core idea consists in
fragmenting confidential information in order to produce insignificant
fragments and then in scattering the fragments so obtained in a redundant
fashion across a distributed system, such as a large network of
workstations and servers. Of these workstations, in principle just the
user’s own workstation needs to be regarded as trusted, whereas from this
user’s viewpoint the other workstations and servers, which in all
probability are under someone else’s control, can be untrusted devices.
This paper describes an object-oriented approach to the use of FRS, now
under development at LAAS and Newcastle. This approach greatly eases the
task of application programmers who seek to ensure reliable secure
processing, as well as storage, of confidential information. The approach
involves fragmenting a confidential object using its composition
structure, i.e., in terms of a hierarchy of sub-objects (the "is-part-of"
relation of the object model), each of course with its own subsidiary
operations or “methods”. The fragmentation process continues until the
resulting sub-objects are as far as possible such as to be individually non-
confidential. Replicas of non-confidential objects are then scattered
among untrusted stations. By such means much of the processing of object
methods, as well as the storing of much object state information, can be
carried out safely on untrusted equipment.
1 Introduction
Mechanisms for fault tolerance in distributed systems are typically designed to cope
with just a limited class of faults: usually just accidental, physical faults which occur
during system operation (some designs take into account only an even more restricted
subclass, such as crash failures). However, other classes of faults may also impede
correct operation of distributed systems; nowadays a numerous such class is certainly
that of intentional human interaction faults, i.e., intrusions. These are deliberate
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attempts at transgressing the security policy assigned to the system. They can
originate from external intruders, registered users trying to exceed their privileges, or
privileged users, such as administrators, operators, security officers, etc., who abuse
their privileges to perform malicious actions.
Intrusions and accidental faults may have the same effects: that is the improper
modification or destruction of sensitive information and the disclosure of confidential
information. The user will perceive these effects as a system failure: the service
delivered by the system to the user no longer complies with the system
specifications1 [1]. In distributed systems composed of users’ individual workstations
and shared servers, users can generally trust their own workstation providing that they
control it completely, while an individual user usually distrusts the servers and the
other workstations because he/she cannot know directly if these servers and
workstations are failing or have been penetrated by an intruder. On the other hand,
server administrators and users distrust other workstations, for the same reasons.
However the trustworthiness of the distributed system can be improved if it is fault-
tolerant, i.e., if the failure of a server or of a workstation is not perceived at the other
workstations, irrespective of the cause of the failure, be it an accidental physical fault
or an intrusion.
Because they do not take intrusions into account classical fault tolerance techniques,
such as  data and processing replication, although they can help to tolerate accidental
faults, do not provide means of preserving confidentiality. Indeed, if intrusions are to
be taken into account and if confidentiality of sensitive information has to be
maintained, simple replication will decrease system trustworthiness, since several
copies of confidential information can be targets for an intrusion. This was the
motivation for a technique which has been developed at LAAS for tolerating faults
while preserving confidentiality, namely the fragmentation-redundancy-scattering
(FRS) technique [2]. Fragmentation consists of breaking down all sensitive
information into fragments, so that any isolated fragment contains no significant
information. Fragments are then scattered among different untrusted sites of the
distributed system, so that any intrusion into part of the distributed system only gives
access to unrelated fragments. Redundancy is added to the fragments (by replication or
the use of an error correcting code) in order to tolerate accidental or deliberate
destruction or alteration of fragments. A complete information item can only be re-
assembled on trusted sites of the distributed system. The FRS technique has already
been applied both to the storage of persistent files and to security management; this
work has been described in several earlier papers, in particular in [2].
The aim of the present paper is to show how FRS, and in particular object-oriented
FRS, can be used in the design and in the implementation of any application or
system service so as to achieve not just reliable and secure storage but also secure
processing of confidential information (e.g. protection from eavesdropping or
interference). Secure processing of confidential information has been investigated
                                                
1 System specifications describe what the system should do, according to performance
and reliability requirements, as well as what it should not, according to safety or
security requirements (e.g. the hazardous states from which a catastrophe may ensue, or
the sensitive information that must not be disclosed to or modified by unauthorized
users).
elsewhere using more conventional ciphering approaches, i.e. the scheme of
processing ciphered data described in [3]. Such approaches need specific ciphers
("Privacy Homomorphisms" [4]) and are rather limited and relatively inefficient;
simple attacks can manage to get clear information. The approach which is advocated
in this paper is quite different since it relies on the fact that confidential information
can very often be decomposed into a collection of non confidential items on which
processing can be done in clear text. The original attempt to extend FRS to cover
information processing [5] required significant manual redesign of the application
programs whose execution was to be protected. In this paper we discuss how such
requirements for application program redesign can be avoided by allying the FRS
technique to an object-oriented approach to system design. In addition, we develop in
this paper a scheme of “confidentiality constraints” expressed in terms of first-order
logic formulae for defining the confidentiality requirements imposed on a given
application, and provide a brief description of the first experiment on the use of FRS
for information processing.
2 Distributed system architecture and assumptions
The distributed system architecture (cf. Fig. 1.) which we consider in this paper is
composed of a set of trusted workstations (more exactly user workstations which are
trusted by their respective users), and a set of untrusted machines which are the basis
for providing a set of fault-tolerant secure servers. A user of a trusted workstation is
responsible for the security of his/her workstation and also for taking all necessary
physical security precautions for ensuring that such sensitive actions as logging in,
and any required authentication are not being observed. During a session of usage of
such a trusted workstation, that workstation resources are not sharable (e.g., remote
access by others to the workstation is disallowed). Confidential information will be
stored on such a workstation during a usage session. However, unless subsequent
security precautions concerning access to that workstation are deemed adequate, such
information will not be left on a workstation after completion of the session. (We do
not consider network-related security and reliability issues in this paper, but would
merely remark that analogous techniques to FRS, involving spread spectrum
communications, already exist, as well of course as numerous conventional ones.)
In this paper we assume the provision of two types of services already implemented
using untrusted sites,  namely the provision of storage and
authentication/authorization. The use of conventional FRS for such provisions has
been successfully demonstrated - see [2]. The authentication and authorization are
realized  by a security server implemented as a set of security sites, administrated by
different operators. As long as a majority of security sites is free of faults and
intrusions (including intrusions by the security administrators), user authentication
and access control are reliably achieved and no sensitive information is disclosed. This
security server can implement various security policies, including multi-level security
(MLS) policies.
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Fig. 1 : Distributed system architecture
With regard to these services, our fault assumptions encompass accidental faults,
physical faults that would affect untrusted sites, but also any type of intrusion that
would affect the untrusted sites or the networks.
Although we admit the possibility of intrusions of untrusted sites, we nevertheless
assume that such intrusions are not particularly easy to carry out, and that the effort
an intruder will have to provide to intrude separately several sites is proportional to
the number of sites involved. (Clearly, the mechanisms described in this paper are
intended to ensure that successful intrusions at one or a small number of untrusted
sites does not provide means of accessing or modifying data or processing activities
that are the responsibility of any other untrusted site.)
3 FRS data processing
3 . 1 Principles
The aim of the original FRS technique was to provide a general framework for the
reliable processing of confidential information, assuming that what matters is the
confidentiality of the information being processed (the data) rather than the
confidentiality of the operations performed on it (the program). This was later
extended to provide confidentiality of information processing [5]. For any application
program or system service, such use of FRS results in the transformation of the
software into a fragmented form according to several basic rules:
1. the application including code and data is divided into application fragments in
such a way that the cooperation of the application fragments satisfies the
specifications of the initial (complete) application;
2. any application fragment shall not provide any confidential information to a
potential intruder on the site where the application fragment is located;
3. all the application fragments shall be scattered among the sites of a distributed
architecture (separation) in such a way that groups of fragments stored at a
given site provide no significant information to an intruder;
4. appropriate redundancy must be introduced either during fragmentation or
scattering;
5. as far as possible, an intruder shall not be able to identify fragments belonging
to the same application process or to the same object, since application
fragments shall be identified from the user site by enciphered references.
A major problem with the use of this original FRS technique was that of how to deal
with fragment code, and in particular how to deal with global variables, a problem
whose solution frequently involved partial redesign of the application programs
involved. This problem provides much of the first motivation for the use of object-
oriented techniques described in this paper.
3 . 2 Object view of FRS
The object model used here is not specific to any particular object-oriented
programming language: we simply assume that objects are derived from classes and
encapsulate data structures that can be manipulated only by a set of functions
(methods); objects can be decomposed into sub-objects that can be identified by
references. The use of inheritance is not discussed very much in this paper.
Nevertheless, inheritance can be used for programming FRS applications in
conjunction with other properties of object-oriented programming languages, such as
reflection  (see Section 5.4).
The main interest of the object model in connection with FRS is that the
fragmentation, being in terms of objects, naturally encompasses program code as well
as data. It can normally be applied to an existing application program without
requiring the designer to reprogram the application - all that has to be done is to
identify which object classes are to be used as the basis on which data and code is to
be fragmented. Such identification involves deciding at what level of the object
structuring it will be the case that the individual objects, when examined in isolation,
do not contain confidential information. Thus the programmer simply has to provide
what are in effect some additional declarations, rather than invent new fragmented
algorithms (which is what the original method of extending FRS to information
processing required).
The design approach which is proposed in this paper thus relies on the fact that the
fragmentation of the application can be based, at design time, on the semantics of the
information being processed. The designer of the application has therefore to find an
appropriate design structuring to obtain non-confidential objects and thus to define
application fragments. The object model offers a convenient design framework for
several reasons: the object notion encapsulates information, objects can be
decomposed into more elementary objects, and any object can readily be mapped onto
an autonomous runtime unit on an appropriate fault-tolerant distributed system.
This approach can be used in different ways and for various applications. For
example, in transaction-processing applications, large amounts of confidential
information can be held in  persistent objects but, in this case, the amount of
processing may be relatively limited. The information and the operations performed
can be organised (structured) in such a way that individual actions of a transaction are
remotely executed by non-confidential objects. In other applications, such as
numerical computations, processing is very intensive but objects are mainly
temporary because there is little persistent state and thus all input parameters can be
given for each activation. (In each case, the links i.e., the references, between objects
belonging to the same application are kept secured at the trusted user workstation,
where the application is started.)
The object-oriented approach to the use of FRS is thus attractive for implementing
various types of applications that hold and process confidential information. A
particular characteristic of the approach is that it provides application designers with a
single unified design scheme for making their applications tolerant to both accidental
and intentional faults.
4 Notion of confidential information
4 . 1 Principles
The notion of confidential information relates to the interpretation an intruder can
have about its semantics in a given operational context. Information semantics may
be confidential depending on its value: for instance, a string of characters might be
sufficiently meaningful in isolation to be easily interpreted as a confidential
information independently of any usage in a program. But this is not always the case;
a numerical value is most unlikely to be interpreted as a confidential information
without any knowledge of its internal representation or of its usage in a given
application context. For example, the bit string corresponding to a salary variable that
holds the value 20000 in the data segment of a program must be mapped to a real
representation in the machine before it could be interpreted as a real value. However
this is not sufficient, as a confidential information item is in fact a combination of
sets of items that bring together information to a potential intruder. Such an intruder
can get meaningful salary information if and only if he is able to associate together
several information items such as: person name, salary amount, salary period and
currency. This simple example shows that very often, thanks to its structure, a
confidential information item is in fact a set of non-confidential data items.  
This notion of confidential information defined as a set of public items may not be
appropriate in some applications or for the management of unstructured objects
(strings, keys, files, etc.) where the semantics is unknown. For instance, in the file
storage system described in [2], FRS was applied to unstructured files (Unix files) and
was based on the use of ciphering techniques and a scheme of regular fragmentation to
produce fragments. Other techniques, such as threshold schemes2, can also be used to
deal with non-structured objects: a number of items higher than the threshold must be
gathered to reconstruct the secret [6]. This technique has mainly been used for small
information items such as cryptographic keys. A similar approach was also used at a
coarse granularity in [7]. In the last two cases, fragmentation provides both
redundancy and ciphering of the data.
The coexistence of both classes of fragmentation techniques can be illustrated by
another example (in fact one which is used in our current major experiment): suppose
a meeting of a group of people is a confidential information item. The information
about the meeting is composed of a list of participants, a given topic, a venue and
time/date items. A participant is defined by his/her personal identity which may be
considered as public information; the same assumption can be made for other items
such as the venue. However, the information about a meeting might be confidential
because of the topic discussed and also because of the identities of the participants
attending. Keeping the meeting information secret may involve ciphering the topic
(given the lack of structural semantics of a character string) and scattering the list of
participants ; only appropriate references to participants need then to be kept in the
meeting object. An operation on the participant list itself is performed within the
meeting object at a given site, while operations on the participant information are
performed at other sites in the network where those participant objects are located.
4 . 2 Confidentiality constraints
The fragmentation principle relies on the notion of confidentiality constraints that
define the confidential information used in the application. These confidentiality
constraints are first expressed informally as part of the non-functional specifications
of the application. These non-functional specifications are interpreted by the
application designer so as to define an appropriate structuring so that each confidential
information item is broken down into non-confidential items. In each object in the
design, the information is structured in terms of a collection of sub-objects
representing information items.
The interpretation of informal confidentiality constraints can be more formally
described in terms of first order logic formulae. For instance, going back to the
simple example given in Section 4, the confidential meeting information can be
structured into more elementary objects such as topic, time/date, venue, person_list .
The formula {meeting == topic ∧ time/date ∧ venue ∧ person_list} indicates first that
meeting is decomposed into the aforementioned items and, second, that the
conjunction of these items reveals sensitive information. Another example would be
the following: {meeting == (topic ∨ time/date ∨ venue) ∧  person_list}; any
combination of person_list and the topic discussed, or the location, or the date of the
meeting is confidential. If the specifications indicate that the list of attendees is also a
confidential information item for any meeting, then {person_list == person
                                                
2 Threshold schemes consist in generating, from a secret information, several shadows so
that a given number T of shadows (T being the threshold) is necessary to reconstruct the
secret information, whereas T-1 shadows does not reveal any confidential information.
The number of shadows is greather than, or equal to T in order to tolerate faults and
intrusions.
[∧ person]*} indicates that any group of persons in the person_list is confidential
information.
Such clauses specify in fact that the left hand side corresponding object is confidential
because the right hand side logical formula composed of sub-objects may reveal
confidential information to an intruder. Any sub-object in one formula may also be
confidential and then be defined by another clause. Finally, a special clause is needed
to specify the set of unstructured objects that are also confidential:
Unstructured confidential objects == {<object> [ , <object>] *}
It is important to mention here that such a formal definition of confidentiality
constraints by means of a set of clauses leads one to identify objects (in italic) used in
further steps of the design process.
5 Object-oriented FRS
Based on the object model described in Section 3.2, the fragmentation design process
operates on a strong structuring of the information in terms of a hierarchy
(composition) of objects. In any object, confidential private information can be
structured as a set of more elementary objects. The fragmentation is thus based on an
appropriate structuring, as originally defined by the designer. The FRS design
approach involves two main tasks:
i) definition of basic objects (classes) that do not contain confidential information
or whose confidential information is ciphered, based on the object composition
hierarchy (fragmentation);
ii) creation of autonomous instances of these basic objects in a large set of
untrusted sites of a distributed computing system (scattering).
The main idea of the object oriented FRS is that it is a recursive design process that
operates on the hierarchical representation of the application and yields application
fragments; the recursion ends as soon as, on every branch of the design tree, an object
that does not process any confidential information is encountered, or, no further
decomposition exists already or can be applied (in which case the data in the object
must be enciphered if its confidentiality is to be protected). The corresponding
runtime fragments are then scattered among the distributed architecture and
communicate via messages. If fragmentation by itself does not introduce adequate
redundancy, then fragments are replicated before being scattered.
5 . 1 Fragmentation
The fragmentation design process can involve several design iterations, starting from
a first version of the design of the application, i.e., a first object composition tree. At
each iteration, the designer performs an analysis of the list of confidentiality
constraints of the application in order to identify the objects containing confidential
information. Then a new design step can be started if some confidential object can be
decomposed into, or is already defined in terms of, more elementary objects. This new
design step produces a refined version of the object composition tree. Then the
designer goes back to a new analysis of the confidentiality constraints that have not
been solved by the previous design  (see Fig. 2).
for any <object > in current design tree
do
if object is confidential then
decompose object further (fragmentation)
or apply ciphering technique
or leave it to a trusted site allocation
end_if
end_for
Fig. 2: Fragmentation principle
 This iterative design process with its analysis of the confidentiality constraints,
continues until non-confidential objects are obtained or a confidential leaf is reached,
and terminates when there are no more confidentiality constraints to solve in the list.
Finally, should there remain any confidential objects that cannot be structured into
more elementary objects, which might either be due to their granularity or their
functionality, ciphering techniques are used.
5 . 2 Redundancy
Several approaches can be used for adding redundancy to fragments. Various error
processing techniques may be used either when the runtime units corresponding to
design objects are created or at a early stage during the design of the application in
term of objects.
The underlying runtime system may offer a set of transparent error processing
protocols that can be selected at configuration time to install runtime units in a
redundant fashion, as in Delta-4 [8]. The latter relies on detection mechanisms and
voting protocols implemented by the underlying multicast communication system.
Several checkpointing strategies between passive replicas and synchronisation
strategies between active replicas are available.
Another approach consists in defining the error processing technique at an early stage
in the design using pre-defined system classes that are responsible for the
implementation of a given solution. The idea is to use the notion of inheritance of
the object model to derive a fault-tolerant implementation of any object. This
solution consists in fact in making inheritable non functional characteristics, using
appropriate system classes and programming conventions. This type of solution has
been used in particular in the Arjuna project [9] where for example any object can be
declared as recoverable.
This declaration means that any object from this class will be created in a redundant
fashion, provided that some declarations are given by the object designer (virtual
function definition, function overloading). System classes must provide by
inheritance a large number of error processing protocols; the development of system
classes can take advantage of basic system services such as error detection and
recovery, atomic broadcast, various voting protocols, stable memory management.
The first work on the use of object-orientation in connection with FRS assumed that
conventional object-oriented inheritance would similarly be used to declare secured
objects [10]. However, there are significant problems with such an approach, and we
now think that the use of reflection is more promising approach (see Section 5.4).
5 . 3 Scattering
The scattering phase consists then in allocating object-fragments replicas to the
computing sites; any object instance must be created as an autonomous computing
unit, i.e., mapped onto a basic runtime unit of the underlying operating system. This
aspect is discussed in Section 6.1.
for any <fragment> in current fragment set
do
if object-fragment is still confidential then
allocate to a trusted site
e l se
until a valid untrusted site is allocated
allocate to an untrusted site
if not creation of a confidential group of objects
then this site is a valid site
end_until
end_if
end_for
Fig. 3: Scattering principle
The scattering phase is summarised in Fig. 3. The main problem in the scattering
phase is to avoid creating sets of objects on the same site that correspond to a
confidential information item. Confidentiality constraints between fragments must
then be taken into account to identify such groups of fragments. The first simple rule
is that object-fragments having the same parent object-fragment must be located on
different sites. But this rule is not sufficient; scattering may group fragments which
are not strictly brothers in the hierarchical design but that may reveal confidential
information. A careful analysis of fragment groups must be done, especially if there
are relatively few sites available to receive scattered fragments.
5 . 4 Use of inheritance and reflection
From an object-oriented programming language viewpoint, FRS leads to the
scattering of sub-objects of a given object.  This means that when the object is
created, some or all of its sub-objects may need to be created remotely. Subsequently,
the conventional scheme for invoking the methods of such remote sub-objects must
be replaced by a scheme of remote method invocation.
The provision of means for so redefining what are normally basic internal operations
(object creation and method invocation) of the language runtime system is not
common. However some object-oriented languages do have the property that they
provide access to such operations and the ability to modify them in the language
itself: this property is known as reflection.
Clearly, even if it were possible, it would be undesirable for the application
programmer to have to program such a redefinition scheme explicitly in the
definitions of each class of objects whose confidentiality is to be protected. What is
needed is a means of indicating, for any given class, that such a scheme is to be used.
In other words, if one considers that a class is itself an object belonging to some
meta-class, the requirement is to have some means of providing in the definition of
the meta-class, the methods of object creation and method invocation that are to be
used by any of its class objects. Such a reflective facility in fact would seem to be of
great promise for not just for object-oriented FRS, but also for  implementing
various non functional characteristics using object-oriented languages [11].
This type of facility was first provided in Common LISP, but has been recently
implemented in a variant of C++ called OpenC++ [12], in which both method
invocation and also access to local variables can be captured and re-defined at the meta-
level. In OpenC++ the application programmer can readily redefine access behaviour
at the meta-level. Inheritance of pre-defined meta-classes allows the definition of new
meta-classes for any object class in the application. This scheme is now being
investigated as a means of providing FRS facilities; the objective is to define meta-
classes for every confidential class in the application, thus hiding object creation
problems (including replication and scattering of sub-objects), but also remote access
problems (including reference computation and access control mechanisms) from the
application programmer.
5 . 5 Summary
The complete design process can be summarised in the several tasks that are
represented in Fig. 4. This figure shows the major steps of the design and
implementation of an FRS application. Several iterations on the design of the
application taking into account confidentiality constraints on the information being
manipulated, lead to the definition of non-confidential objects. These non-confidential
objects are the application fragments. According to the runtime abstractions provided
by the runtime system, application fragments are mapped onto autonomous runtime
units. Adequate error processing protocols are then selected on an object-by-object
basis leading to a set of autonomous runtime object replicas. This selection takes into
account the functionality of the object and also the accidental fault assumptions that
can be made regarding the available sites on the distributed configuration. The last
phase of the design process consists in scattering these replicas. The scattering phase
must take care to avoid gathering together groups of objects that can be perceived by
an intruder as constituting a confidential information item. Confidentiality constraints
between object replicas must thus be taken into account for the allocation of sites to
runtime units. The set of replicas is in fact divided into two subsets: (i) object
replicas that do not contain confidential information and that can be executed on
untrusted stations, but also (ii) the set of some still confidential objects that must be
executed on trusted sites of the distributed system.
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6 Implementation issues
6 . 1 Distributed runtime environment
The degree of difficulty involved in implementing an object-based application largely
depends on the abstractions provided by the distributed runtime system. Object
fragments have to be mapped onto autonomous runtime units. The system we have
used for our current major experiment, the Delta-4 system, does not provide the
notion of object; instead it provides the notion of a server, though this is not far from
the object notion as previously defined. It corresponds to a private address space and a
set of operations with well-defined interfaces. Object mapping can be done in various
ways: (i) any object instance corresponds at runtime to a server, or (ii) a server is
responsible for any instance creation for a given class. The second of these approaches
is the one we have used. The Delta-4 distributed runtime layer, namely Deltase3,
provides server mapping on top of Unix (the local executive) and a transparent
multiple remote procedure call mechanism used for remote method invocation
between object manager replicas. The set of servers provides an object management
layer on top of the distributed runtime layer.
In the implementation of FRS, the object runtime layer may involve several instance
managers (Deltase servers) per class. At one extreme, any site on the network may
provide an instance manager for any class in the application. The scattering algorithm
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may then allocate any object instance on any site. Objects can be created dynamically
by invoking the appropriate create operation of the corresponding instance manager.
The Delta-4 distributed runtime system layer includes a set of error processing
protocols used to install replicated servers.
6 . 2 User authentication and authorization
As indicated in Section 2, user authentication and authorization are achieved by a
distributed security server composed of several security sites. A user is authenticated
when at least a majority of security sites agree to authenticate him [2]. One
authenticated, the user can request access to services. This request is evaluated by each
security site according to user privileges, service access control list and security
policy. All the sites decisions to grant or deny the access are voted on each security
site and if a majority is reached to grant the access, an access key is transmitted from
the security sites to the user site by means of a threshold scheme [6].
The access control approach, briefly presented in this paragraph, is used for any
application, system server or simply any object (files) implemented by FRS on
untrusted computing resources. The key which is gathered at the user site, will be
used latter on by the application for referencing fragments using cryptographic
functions (see Section 6.3.).
6 . 3 Reference management
The scattering of objects in a distributed environment requires an identification
mechanism to allow remote invocation. In fact, most of the security of FRS relies on
the fact that an intruder is not able to gather fragments from outside the trusted user
site or to invoke objects (fragments) directly. The reference4 management system
must first ensure that related fragments (belonging to the same application) cannot be
identified just by looking at object references. References can then be dynamically
computed at the trusted site using the secret key, provided for this application and for
this user by the authorization protocol.
Looking more carefully at a fragmented application (cf. Fig. 5), one can see that the
application is in most cases implemented finally as a “star structure” whose centre is
located at the trusted user site. The centre of the star is at least the root of the object
composition tree.
An ideal reference system must ensure: (i) unique identification of the remote object-
fragment, (ii) authentication of the invoking application, and (iii) verification of
permissions on the invoked object:
reference = Ek (object_name, application_name, object_permissions).
A very simple way of using references can just be to consider them as capabilities: as
soon as they are provided to an object manager (i.e., when the reference is known)
then the corresponding object is activated. In this case, the ciphering algorithm E is a
one-way function and k is the application secret key.
                                                
4 A reference is viewed here as a generalisation of the notion of pointer in a distributed
environment.
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A more sophisticated solution would be to decipher the reference at the object
manager site to check authenticity and permissions. In that case a shared secret key
must be used to implement this solution; the key must then be kept securely in any
station in a local trusted sub-system (local TCB [13]). In this case, the ciphering
algorithm E is based on a secret key cryptosystem and k is a secret key shared by the
user application at the user site and one of the untrusted sites (where one copy of the
invoked object is located).
Finally, shared objects between two or more different applications will have different
references, thus preventing search by induction on shared objects.
7 Experimentation
We have investigated the above FRS design approach on a detailed example, a
distributed Electronic Diary, which has been implemented on the Delta-4 system. A
more detailed description can found in [10]. We describe here this application using a
small series of classes, so leading to a hierarchical design of the E-Diary. In this
simple example, a number of confidentiality constraints on the processed information
have been defined and taken into account. The processing facilities provided (i.e. the
operations that can be performed on defined objects) are in fact very limited in the
current version of the E-Diary application and the defined objects are persistent.
Another possible type of application would be to have no persistence and heavy
computation such as in numerical computations on sensitive information (e.g.
missile trajectory computation). However, the E-Diary example provides a convenient
means of illustrating the object-oriented FRS design steps described in Section 5.
7 . 1 Functional specifications
The functional specifications only address the definition of management operations on
meetings day-by-day; the information related to a meeting is composed of a given
topic, a group of people attending, a venue and time/date information. Any person
attending is defined by several identification items. The information used for the
management of meetings is stored in each of a set of meeting descriptors and can be
summarised as follows:
• topic: topic to be discussed during the meeting;
• venue/time/date: place where the meeting is held and time/date information;
• dynamic person list: list of persons attending the meeting.
These descriptors are the main leaves of a tree (a sub-tree) of the E-Diary which is
considered as being an object which is private to a given user (the E-Diary is not
shared by multiple users). Each person in the list is defined by several information
items such as name/firstname, full address, and phone_number. Some periods like
days, weeks or months may be locked for a given reason (travel abroad or any
personal reason for instance). The E-Diary also includes a note-pad where messages
may be stored on a day-by-day basis. The E-Diary provides functions to insert, list or
remove any of the above defined objects. The italic words indicate most of the objects
used in the design of E-Diary application.
7 . 2 Confidentiality constraints
The description of the example given in Section 7.1. can be augmented with an
informal description of confidentiality constraints. These were chosen to be the
following:
1. Any two or more of items in a given meeting such as topic, time/date, venue,
person_list considered as constituting confidential information.
2. Personal identification items such as name, address and phone number can be
individually considered as being public information; but any pair of such
information items including person name is confidential.
3. The group of persons attending the same meeting is considered as constituting
a confidential information item.
4. Any unstructured information items such as topic of a meeting, message in the
note pad, and locking reason for a day, week or month is confidential.
The interpretation we have made of this informal description of the confidentiality
constraints leads to the following formal description:
Confidentiality clauses Unstructured
confidential objects
1) person == {name ∧ (address ⁄ phone number)}
2) meeting == {venue ∧ topic ∧ time/date ∧ [person]*,
 venue ∧ time/date ∧ [person]*,
time/date ∧ [person]*,
person ∧ [person]*}
{topic, message,
 locking_reasons}
These constraints have to be taken into account in order to refine the first design and
to identify fragments. They are also used for scattering.
7 . 3 Final object-oriented design
Several design steps were performed to obtain the final design of the E-Diary objects
and to identify fragments in the design. In the first design the meeting object was not
decomposed into sub-objects as candidate fragments. The list of persons attending a
meeting also did not appear . Since meetings and persons are confidential objects (see
clauses 1 and 2) some decomposition into more elementary objects was performed
such as represented in Fig. 6. Some of the object classes (and their component
objects) forming the E-Diary application object are shown, where an asterisk indicates
the possibility of there being several components of a given object class.
*
*
*
* *
*
monthowner
lock_month
lock_weekday
message lock_daymeeting
venue time topicP-list
person
address phone_#name
E-diary
week
Fig. 6:  The E-Diary object composition hierarchy (final version)
The object hierarchies presented in Fig. 6 illustrate the various components in the
design of the E-Diary object down to elementary objects, the latter being a
combination of elementary objects such as integers, booleans, strings, etc. Some of
the elementary objects represented by grey boxes are confidential leaves of the tree
that according to our assumptions cannot be usefully decomposed into smaller
objects; for instance owner, messages, locking reason and meeting topic are strings
that are assumed to be ciphered to ensure confidentiality as soon as they are entered by
the user in the system.
Pre-defined confidentiality constraints lead to separating as fragments objects that will
be managed by separate instance managers in the implementation. Topic, venue and
time/date objects are assumed to be object-fragments. The P-list  object may still be
kept in the meeting objects since it contains only pointers (references) to persons
managed by an instance manager of class person in the implementation. Person is
thus another object-fragment. As a consequence, the meeting object is then relatively
empty since meeting sub-objects are scattered in separate fragments.
8 Conclusions and future work
The electronic diary system is the first sizeable experiment we have undertaken in
implementing an application using Object-Oriented Fragmentation-Redundancy-
Scattering techniques. As such the experiment has greatly assisted us in formulating a
methodical approach to the use of the techniques, and helped to motivate the
development of the scheme for expressing confidentiality constraints that we have
described in Section 4. More complex processing could be added to actual object-
fragments even in this simple example without introducing any confidentiality
problem.
The granularity of objects-fragments obtained in the example to solve the
confidentiality problem might appear relatively small. However, this technique can
also be used to solve some problems using a very coarse granularity; for instance, let
us consider a medical record system where the information is classified into two parts,
administrative and properly medical. In this quite simple example, there is no need to
go further in the fragmentation process as soon as the link between these two large
fragments (some references) is retained at the trusted site. Access to one or both parts
of the information (if necessary) then needs appropriate user authentication (medical or
administrative staff) to properly grant related authorization.
The performance of FRS mainly depends on the granularity of the fragmentation.
Nevertheless, FRS need not introduce any significant information and processing
overhead (reassembly is negligible); it obviously introduces communication overhead
with respect to a pure processing replication, e.g., in an application that does not
attempt to tolerate intentional faults. Although parallelism is not the aim of our
fragmentation process, the additional opportunities it provides for the use of
parallelism can be of significant benefit with regard to application performance in
suitable circumstances. In particular they could reduce the impact of such
communication overheads.
From a programming viewpoint, given the awkwardness of the manual translation
involved in the final stages of implementation down onto the Delta-4 platform, more
extensive trials of further applications will probably best await the provision of
means for automatically installing applications onto a suitable object-oriented
distributed runtime layer. We are at present just starting to investigate the suitability
for this purpose of COOL [14], which runs on the Chorus micro-kernel operating
system [15], in the hope that this will provide us with a good basis for using FRS in
connection with C++. Other topics on which more work is needed include naming
facilities for reference management, algorithms to compute references, and access
control mechanisms for fine grain object invocation. By such work we hope to
develop the object-oriented FRS scheme to the point where experiments can enable
realistic cost/effectiveness assessment of the scheme on a variety of applications.
However in parallel we also plan to continue recent closely-related work on object-
oriented language concepts, not just inheritance but also in particular delegation and
reflection [11], which we believe will facilitate the structuring and implementation of
applications using various dependability-related mechanisms in combination,
including of course FRS. The OpenC++ language [13] is currently our favoured
candidate for experimenting reflection in the implementation of FRS application.
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